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I.

Introduction

One of the most prominent recent technological trends has been the rise
of personal activity monitors (“fitness trackers”)—devices that allow users
to track, monitor, and share the minute details of their physical lives.
Companies like Fitbit, Jawbone, Apple, Nike, and Garmin offer devices
that track a user’s heart rate, number of steps taken, activity levels, sleep
quality and duration, and calories burned.1 The various types of sensitive
information collected by these devices can be categorized as “personal
fitness information” (“PFI”). Additionally, these devices are capable of
wirelessly syncing sensitive health information they collect to users’
computers, smartphones, and social media accounts.2
In the landmark case of Katz v. United States,3 the Supreme Court
established that individuals are entitled to a reasonable expectation of
privacy.4 But what constitutes a reasonable expectation of privacy when
individuals voluntarily share their private information? The popularity of
fitness trackers raises crucial privacy concerns such as how much control
users of fitness trackers actually exercise over the use of their PFI and
whether that control is meaningful.
This note will address the unique and heightened privacy concerns
presented by fitness trackers and address the gaps in current privacy laws,
which fail to provide adequate consumer protections or regulation of these
devices. Part II of this note will detail the rise in popularity of fitness
trackers, the development of privacy rights through case law, and the key

1. See Brent Rose, The Best Fitness Tracker for Every Need, GIZMODO (Dec. 19, 2014),
http://gizmodo.com/the-best-fitness-tracker-for-every-exercise-1673000514.
2. Julia M. Siripurapu, On the Twelfth Day of Privacy, My True Love Gave to Me . . . 12
Different Types of Wearables!, NAT’L L. REV. (Dec. 24, 2014), http://www.natlawreview.com/
article/twelfth-day-privacy-my-true-love-gave-to-me-12-different-types-wearables.
3. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
4. See id. at 360 (Harlan, J., concurring) (recognizing that “a person has a constitutionally
protected reasonable expectation of privacy”).

2015

WHY SHOULD WE CARE WHAT FITBIT SHARES?

93

features of the Health Information Portability and Accountability Act of
19965 (“HIPAA”) in order to provide relevant context to the privacy
concerns raised by these devices. Part III will break down the privacy
concerns raised by fitness trackers into three separate, but related,
categories: (1) The Dangers of the Quantified Self; (2) The Dangers of
Using Fitness Trackers in the Employment Context; and (3) The Dangers
Associated with Big Data. Each of these categories presents unique
privacy concerns and, together, they demonstrate the urgent need for
regulating fitness trackers. Accordingly, Part IV proposes a statutory
solution modeled after HIPAA, but crafted to explicitly protect the
sensitive information gathered and stored by fitness tracking devices. Even
though HIPAA, as amended by the Health Information Technology for
Economic and Clinical Health Act (“HITECH Act”), protects against the
improper disclosure of private health information,6 this note contends that
the statute does not provide adequate protection to users of fitness trackers
because it generally does not apply to those devices. While HIPAA does
not typically apply to fitness trackers or PFI, HIPAA is an appropriate
statutory model because it outlines a comprehensive approach to protecting
sensitive information.

II. Background
A.

The Rise of Fitness Trackers

It is no secret that the rise of connected or “smart” devices has been
meteoric.7 According to one study, more than 30 billion devices could be
wirelessly connected to the Internet by the year 2020.8 Fitness trackers, a
subset of the Internet of Things, are wearable devices that allow users to
track, record, and share every step taken, calorie burned, and hour slept, via
the Internet.9 A study by Pricewaterhouse Coopers indicated that one in
five American adults owns a wearable device,10 and the research firm
Canalys reported that eight million activity-tracking bands were expected
to ship in 2014.11 Canalys also estimated that the number of fitness
5. Pub. L. 104-191, 110 Stat. 1936 (104th Cong. 2d Sess., 1996)
6. Summary of the HIPAA Privacy Rule, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS.,
http://www.hhs.gov/ocr/privacy/hipaa/understanding/summary/ (last visited Feb. 27, 2014).
7. Brad Turner, When Big Data Meets Big Brother: Why Courts Should Apply United
States v. Jones to Protect People’s Data., 16 N.C. J.L. & TECH. 377, 392 (2015).
8. Id.
9. See Siripurapu, supra note 2.
10. Id.
11. James A. Martin, Pros and Cons of Using Fitness Trackers for Employee Wellness, CIO
(Mar. 24, 2014), http://www.cio.com/article/2377723/it-strategy/pros-and-cons-of-using-fitnesstrackers-for-employee-wellness.html.
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trackers expected to ship will rise to 23 million units by 2015 and to more
than 45 million by 2017.12 In fact, seven million fitness bands were sold in
Q1 of 2015 alone.13 While it is difficult to predict the exact number of
fitness trackers that will be sold in the next few years,14 it is clear from this
data that fitness tracker sales are rapidly increasing.
As fitness trackers grow in popularity, more companies have
introduced their own models.15 For instance, a December 2014 article
published by Gizmodo listed nearly 25 different brands that offer, or will
soon offer, fitness-tracking devices with features ranging from step
counting to sleep tracking and others.16 For example, Fitbit currently offers
six different models of fitness trackers: “Zip,” “One,” “Flex,” “Surge,”
“Charge,” and “Charge HR,” which offer a range of features,17 including
steps taken, distance traveled, calories burned, floors climbed, hours slept,
alarm functions, heart rate monitoring, GPS tracking, wireless syncing, text
notifications, caller ID, music controls, and both online and mobile tools.18
Similarly, Jawbone currently offers four different models of fitness trackers
that include features19 such as steps and distance tracking, calories burned,
food and drink logging, “Smart Coach,”20 sleep tracking, goal setting,
“Smart Alarm,” “Idle Alert,” heart health monitoring, auto activity
classification,21 water resistance, wireless syncing, a compatible mobile

12. Id.
13. Sophie Charara, If You Own a Fitness Tracker, Chances Are It’s a Fitbit, WAREABLE
(May 22, 2015), http://www.wareable.com/fitbit/fitness-tracker-sales-2015-fitbit-1169.
14. Compare estimates presented in Martin, supra note 11, to estimates reported in Deborah
Lupton, Self-tracking Modes: Reflexive Self-Monitoring and Data Practices, NEWS & MEDIA
RESEARCH CTR., UNIV. OF CANBERRA (2014), and Zsarlene B. Chua, Privacy Risks Threaten
Future of Wearables, BUSINESSWORLD (December 23, 2014), http://www.bworldonline.com/
content.php?section=Technology&title=privacy-risks-threaten-future-of-wearables&id=100041.
15. See Rose, supra note 1.
16. Id.
17. Some models do not offer all of the features listed. For example, more basic models
such as the “Flex” do not include a continuous heart rate monitor, sleep tracking & alarm
function, GPS tracking, or floors climbed. See Find Your Fit, FITBIT, https://www.fitbit.com/
compare (last visited Sept. 15, 2015).
18. Id.
19. Some models do not offer all of the features listed. For example, the “UPmove” model
does not include the “Smart Alarm,” “Idle Alert,” heart health monitoring, or auto activity
classification features. See Compare Trackers, JAWBONE, https://jawbone.com/up/trackers (last
visited Sept. 15, 2015).
20. Id.
21. See id. (stating that this feature, available on all three models, learns habits and
recognizes an individual user’s activities over time “by using data from the built-in accelerometer
and sensors to identify patterns in your movement and automatically associates them with
activities”).
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app, and even the ability to make American Express payments.22 These are
just the features offered by two of the big names behind fitness trackers.
This wide range of features demonstrates that consumers are purchasing
these devices and using them to track every detail of their physical lives.
These devices are, therefore, capable of painting nuanced portraits of their
users’ health, activity levels, and overall wellness in an unprecedented level
of detail.
While these features offer a variety of health benefits,23 they also raise
privacy concerns. Jawbone’s auto activity classification and Smart Coach
features raise particularly high privacy risks because they use data gathered
by the device to identify patterns and make conclusions about a user’s
activities.24 The ability of these devices to not only record but also analyze
and assess fitness information raises important privacy concerns regarding
how this fitness information is transmitted and protected, particularly when
companies can share this information with third parties or use it for their
own benefit, and even when such information can be used as evidence in a
court of law.25 These are just a few of the privacy concerns raised when
individuals voluntarily record and transmit their every move with the help
of personal fitness trackers.
B.

The Reasonable Expectation of Privacy

In 1890, Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis first articulated the legal
right to privacy.26 Nearly eighty years later, Justice Harlan set forth the
“reasonable expectation of privacy” standard in Katz.27 There, the Court
recognized that the Constitution protects what a person seeks to preserve as
private, even in a publically accessible area.28 In Katz, the pressing privacy
concern was third party surveillance or intrusion upon an individual’s

22. See id. (“Smart Coach was designed with human nature in mind. It takes all the inputs it
receives from your UP® tracker and analyzes that information to give you the personalized
advice and insights you need to reach your fitness, sleep and overall health goals.”).
23. See e.g., The Up® System, JAWBONE, https://jawbone.com/up (last visited Feb. 8, 2015)
(inviting users to “[i]mprove the quality of your days and nights through a deeper understanding
of how your diet, sleep, activity and the choices you make affect your health and well-being”).
24. See Compare Trackers, JAWBONE, supra note 19.
25. See George Waggott & Wilson McCutchan, Fitbit Evidence: Coming Soon to a Court
Near You, MONDAQ (Nov. 21, 2014), http://www.mondaq.com/canada/x/355492/employment
+litigation+tribunals/Fitbit+Evidence+Coming+Soon+To+A+Court+Near+You (reporting that a
Canadian litigator will rely on Fitbit tracking information as evidence that his client suffered
debilitating personal injuries).
26. Samuel D. Warren and Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193
(Dec. 1890) (recognizing the “right to be let alone”).
27. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 360 (Harlan, J., concurring) (“. . . [A] person
has a constitutionally protected reasonable expectation of privacy.”).
28. Id. at 351.
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privacy, typically when the individual is unaware that they are being
recorded.29 While the “reasonable expectation” standard of privacy may
have been appropriate in the late 1960s, it is unclear how that standard
translates into the modern technological realities of fitness trackers,
Facebook, and Twitter when individuals routinely record and share the
details of their daily lives. Today, the concerns around privacy have
shifted dramatically because contemporary surveillance is no longer just
third party surveillance, but also “self-surveillance.”30 Scholars have
described the phenomenon of self-surveillance as “[u]sing various existing
and emerging technologies, such as GPS-enabled smartphones, we are
beginning to measure ourselves in granular detail—how long we sleep,
where we go, what we breathe, what we eat, how we spend our time.”31
Thus, the fundamental difference between the surveillance
contemplated in Katz and self-surveillance is that, for self-surveillance,
“the threat may actually come from ourselves.”32 According to one
scholar, “[n]early everything people do today becomes data. And nearly
every bit of data is shared, knowingly or unknowingly, voluntarily or
involuntarily, with others.”33 Moreover, much of this data is collected, as
in the case of fitness trackers, because individuals are voluntarily and
intentionally participating in self-surveillance. What limits can the
reasonable expectancy of privacy standard provide when individuals are
intentionally recording their thoughts, activities, and behaviors and sharing
them with the world?34 In other words, how does the reasonable
expectation of privacy function when consumers voluntarily share their
fitness information to a select group of people or even publicly?
Although the Third Party doctrine has established that anything a
person knowingly exposes to the public is in the public sphere and,
therefore, not subject to the Fourth Amendment, that doctrine has been
called into question.35 Notably, in United States v. Jones, Justice
Sotomayor’s concurrence challenged the Third Party doctrine, calling it “ill
29. Id.; See also Jerry Kang, Katie Shilton, Deborah Estrin, Jeff Burke, and Mark Hansen,
Self-Surveillance Privacy, 97 IOWA L. REV. 809, 825 (2012) (“In the standard privacy problem,
personal data are collected by some counterparty in the course of an individual’s interaction with
that counterparty.”).
30. Kang et al., supra note 29, at 814.
31. Id. at 812.
32. Id.
33. See Turner, supra note 7, at 381.
34. See United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 957 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., concurring)
(recognizing that the reasonable expectation of privacy has changed in the digital age, in which
people regularly reveal a great deal of information about themselves to third parties).
35. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967); United States v. Miller, 425 U.S.
435, 442 (1976), superseded by statute, Right to Financial Privacy Act, 12 U.S.C.S. §§ 3401–
3422, as recognized in Dadidov v. SEC, 415 F. Supp. 2d 386, 387 (S.D.N.Y 2006).
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suited to the digital age, in which people reveal a great deal of information
about themselves to third parties in the course of carrying out mundane
tasks.”36 She stated that she “would not assume that all information
voluntarily disclosed . . . for a limited purpose is, for that reason alone,
disentitled to Fourth Amendment protection.”37 This note contends, as
Justice Sotomayor suggests, that users do not forfeit their reasonable
expectation of privacy simply because they have shared fitness information
with companies like Fitbit and Jawbone for limited health-related purposes.
While user expectations may be somewhat limited, they can still reasonably
expect that their information will only be used as outlined in company
privacy policies38 for specific purposes and should still retain control over
how their information is shared with third parties. For example, if a
company shares user information in violation of its own privacy policy, the
Federal Trade Commission can impose fines under the Federal Trade
Commission Act (“FTCA”).39 Thus, the reasonable expectation of privacy
standard still applies in the digital age and is strengthened by statutes like
the FTCA and HIPAA, which protect against the improper uses of personal
information.
C.

The Health Information Portability and Accountability Act of 1996

HIPAA was enacted in 1996 and amended by the HITECH (“the Act”)
in 2009.40 The Act protects against the improper disclosure of individually
identifiable health information held by covered entities and their business
associates.41 The purpose behind the Act is to balance protecting
individuals’ health information with permitting the disclosure of health
information necessary for effective patient care.42 HIPAA achieves this
purpose by establishing the first set of national standards for protecting
health information.43 However, HIPAA is limited because it does not apply
to all health information or all companies that handle health information.44

36. Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 957 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
37. Id.
38. See infra Section III.
39. DANIEL J. SOLOVE & PAUL M. SCHWARTZ, PRIVACY LAW FUNDAMENTALS 134
(2013).
40. Summary of the HIPAA Privacy Rule, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS.,
supra note 6.
41. Health Information Privacy, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS.,
http://www.hhs.gov/ocr/privacy/hipaa/understanding/index.html (last visited Feb. 27, 2014).
42. Id.
43. Summary of the HIPAA Privacy Rule, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS.,
supra note 6.
44. See id.
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HIPAA only covers Protected Health Information (“PHI”),45 which is
defined as “individually identifiable health information.”46 In addition,
HIPAA only applies to covered entities—health plans, health care
clearinghouses, and any health care provider who transmits health
information in electronic form—and their business associates.47
Although HIPAA does not cover fitness trackers or PFI, its
comprehensive approach to protecting sensitive information serves as a
strong model for protecting PFI. HIPAA provides substantial protections
by requiring Notice, Right of Access, and Authorization.48 While the
Notice requirement establishes that covered entities must give notice
regarding their privacy practices, the Right of Access requirement grants
patients the right to access any PHI used to make decisions about them.49
Additionally, the Authorization requirement establishes that patient
authorization is required for all uses and disclosures of health information,
except for treatment, payment, or healthcare operations.50 HIPAA also
explicitly requires patient authorization in order to use data for marketing
purposes.51
HIPAA consists of three primary parts: (1) The Standards for Privacy
of Individually Identifiable Health Information (“The Privacy Rule”),52 (2)
The Security Standards for the Protection of Electronic Protected Health
Information (“The Security Rule”),53 and (3) The HITECH Act.54 The
Privacy Rule aims to limit the circumstances in which PHI may be used or
disclosed.55 It provides that “[a] covered entity must make reasonable
efforts to use, disclose, and request only the minimum amount of protected
health information needed to accomplish the intended purpose of the use,
disclosure, or request.”56
45. Id.
46. See SOLOVE & SCHWARTZ, supra note 39, at 134.
47. Summary of the HIPAA Privacy Rule, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS.,
supra note 6.
48. SOLOVE & SCHWARTZ, supra note 39, at 104.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Summary of the HIPAA Privacy Rule, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS.,
supra note 6.
53. Summary of the HIPAA Security Rule, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS.,
http://www.hhs.gov/ocr/privacy/hipaa/understanding/srsummary.html (last visited Feb. 27, 2014).
54. HITECH Act Enforcement Interim Final Rule, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN
SERVS., http://www.hhs.gov/ocr/privacy/hipaa/understanding/index.html (last visited Feb. 27,
2014).
55. Summary of the HIPAA Privacy Rule, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS.,
supra note 6.
56. Id.
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Unlike the Privacy Rule, the Security Rule only applies to electronic
protected health information (“e-PHI”), a subset of PHI that includes “all
individually identifiable health information a covered entity creates,
receives, maintains or transmits in electronic form.”57 The Security Rule
establishes standards for protecting e-PHI by requiring technical and nontechnical safeguards.58 These safeguards include training and hiring
security personnel, workforce training, ensuring facility access and control,
workspace and device security, controlling access, and ensuring protected
information is not improperly altered or deleted.59 While the Security Rule
takes a flexible, case-by-case approach to protecting e-PHI, it establishes
four basic requirements of covered entities: (1) ensuring the confidentiality
and integrity of e-PHI they create or transmit; (2) identifying and protecting
against threats to security; (3) protecting against reasonably anticipated
impermissible uses or disclosures; and (4) ensuring compliance by its
workforce.60
The HITECH Act, enacted in February 2009,61 establishes notification
requirements for data security breaches of covered entities that involve
PHI.62 The Act defines a breach as “an unauthorized disclosure of
unencrypted PHI.”63 Additionally, it establishes that notification must be
given “without reasonable delay,”64 requires that breaches that affect more
than 500 individuals must be reported to the media,65 and extends HIPAA
to cover business associates.66 Together, these three components of
HIPAA provide the foundation for a comprehensive approach to protecting
PHI held by covered entities and business associates.
Adopting a similar approach to data collected by fitness trackers would
provide comprehensive protection of PFI. Protections like the Security
Rule and the data breach notification requirements of the HITECH Act are
especially important in the context of fitness trackers because PFI is almost
exclusively electronic information, which presents particularly high
security and data breach risks.

57. HITECH Act Enforcement Interim Final Rule, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN
SERVS., supra note 54.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Summary of the HIPAA Security Rule, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS.,
supra note 53..
62. SOLOVE & SCHWARTZ, supra note 39, at 99, 107.
63. Id. at 107
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 103.
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HIPAA does not provide a private right of action.67 Instead, the
Department of Justice is responsible for criminal enforcement, while the
Department of Health and Human Services (“HHS”) is responsible for civil
enforcement through its Office of Civil Rights.68 However, scholars such
as Daniel Solove and Peter Winn have pointed out that plaintiffs have been
able to use HIPAA to establish standard of care when bringing common
law actions under state law.69 Solove explains, “[f]or breach of
confidentiality, courts look to norms, ethical rules, and laws to determine
the duties that caregivers owe to patients. HIPAA is a law that establishes
duties, and thus serves as a useful source of duties for the common law.”70
For example, as Solove observes,71 both the Connecticut Supreme Court in
Byrne v. Avery Center for Obstetrics and Gynecology72 and the West
Virginia Supreme Court73 held that HIPAA may be used to establish the
standard of care in negligence claims. Winn also argues, “the HIPAA
Privacy Rules are likely to be adopted in private state actions for breach of
confidentiality as establishing the duty.”74 Thus, HIPAA not only
establishes a comprehensive approach to protecting sensitive health
information enforced by federal agencies, but also aids plaintiffs seeking to
bring common law claims for invasions of privacy. Applying Solove and
Winn’s work to the fitness tracker context, the HIPAA model demonstrates
that a private right of action may not be necessary in order to effectively
protect PFI.

III. The Heightened Privacy Concerns Presented By Using
Fitness Trackers to Record and Transmit Personal Fitness
Information
A.

The Dangers of the Quantified Self

The natural product of self-surveillance is the “Quantified Self.” The
Quantified Self Movement takes advantage of technology in order to

67. Id. at 99.
68. Id. at 106.
69. See Daniel Solove, Lawsuits for HIPAA Violations and Beyond: A Journey Down the
Rabbit Hole, LINKEDIN PULSE (Nov. 8, 2014), https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/20141118051323
-2259773-lawsuits-for-hipaa-violations-and-beyond-a-journey-down-the-rabbit-hole?trk=mp-read
er-card; Peter A. Winn, Confidentiality in Cyberspace: The HIPAA Privacy Rules and the
Common Law, 33 RUTGERS L.J. 617, 619–20 (2002).
70. Solove, supra note 69; Winn, supra note 69, at 619–20.
71. Solove, supra note 69.
72. Byrne v. Avery Ctr. for Obstetrics and Gynecology, No. 18904, 2014 WL 5507439
(Conn. Nov. 11, 2014)
73. R.K. v. St. Mary’s Med. Ctr., 735 S.E.2d 715 (W.Va. 2012).
74. Winn, supra note 69, at 19–20.
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encourage self-awareness by tracking data relating to an individual’s
exercise, diet, sleep habits, health maintenance, financial management,
learning, and general wellness.75 Although fitness trackers may provide
significant benefits in terms of health and wellness, the level of detail that
these devices can convey about their wearers’ private lives raises unique
and heightened privacy concerns.76 Wearable devices like fitness trackers
present especially high privacy risks “because of the kinds and volume of
data they collect. This includes, but isn’t limited to, email addresses,
logins, passwords and other credentials; steps; heart-rate information;
physical addresses, routes travelled and other location data; sleep habits,
and height and weight details.”77 In the words of Kevin Haley, the Director
of Symantec’s Security Response Team, “[i]t’s the nature of the data that’s
being collected . . . . This is really getting to the essence of our being. It’s
hard to believe people are willing to share all this stuff, especially around
health.”78
Arguably, a greater cause for concern is not simply the volume and
type of data being collected, but what the data is used for and where it is
sent. For example, a recent test of twelve fitness apps performed by the
Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”) found that those apps transmitted
personal information and other data to 76 different entities.79 What is more
alarming is that an FTC Commissioner admitted, “[w]e don’t know where
that information ultimately goes.”80
When it comes to the Quantified Self, it is difficult to imagine that
consumers can make meaningful or informed decisions about privacy and
the collection of massive amounts of sensitive health information when
they are unaware of who receives that information or the reason it is being
collected. As Haley points out, “[i]n five years, we’ll discover it’s being
used in ways we couldn’t have guessed. In the short term, people may not
care if people know how much they weigh, but . . . we may not ultimately
want people to have that information.”81

75. Turner, supra note 7, at 388 (citing Joseph Bradley, When IoE Gets Personal: The
Quantified Self Movement!, CISCO BLOG (Sept. 10, 2013), http://blogs.cisco.com/zzfeatured/
when-ioe-gets-personal-the-quantified-self-movement/).
76. See Al Sacco, Fitness Trackers Are Changing Online Privacy—and It’s Time to Pay
Attention, TECH HIVE (Aug. 15, 2014), http://www.techhive.com/article/2465820/fitness-trackersare-changing-online-privacy-and-its-time-to-pay-attention.html.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Editorial, Smart Watches and Weak Privacy Rules, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 15, 2014),
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/09/16/opinion/smartwatches-and-weak-privacy-rules.html?_r=0.
80. Id.
81. See Sacco, supra note 76.
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Another concern, which is often overlooked, is the different levels of
sharing. A user may be comfortable sharing her PFI with a select group,
for example, all of her friends or her workout group. However, simply
because that user has chosen to share her PFI with a particular group does
not mean that she has given permission for her information to be shared
with advertisers or the general public. Additionally, the fact that a user has
shared PFI for one purpose, such as assisting in reaching fitness goals, does
not mean she should be required to share that information for other
purposes like advertising. The fact that users have chosen to share certain
information does not necessarily indicate they have completely forfeited
any reasonable expectation of privacy in that information. In fact, the
choices individuals make about who to share their PFI with, when to share,
and what that information may be used for, strongly suggest that users
expect their fitness information to only be shared in particular ways and for
particular purposes dictated by the users’ choices.
B.

Fitbit in the Office: Incentivized Sharing of Fitness Information in the
Employment Context

Fitness trackers raise particularly high concerns because they present
new types of privacy problems. Unlike the traditional privacy concerns of
third-party surveillance,82 users of fitness trackers voluntarily record and
transmit their lives in granular detail. Thus, the most pressing issue is not
whether users are being recorded, but what happens to the sensitive
information collected by fitness trackers after users have intentionally and
voluntarily shared it.
Concerns over how PFI is used are particularly poignant when fitness
trackers are used in the employment context. Many employers are
beginning to incorporate fitness trackers into wellness programs as a tool
for improving their employees’ health.83 The research firm Gartner
estimates that 10,000 companies offered fitness trackers to their staff in
2014.84 Fitbit, for example, has begun selling its devices to employers
82. Kang et al., supra note 29, at 825 (“In the standard privacy problem, personal data are
collected by some counterparty in the course of an individual’s interaction with that
counterparty.”).
83. See Lisa Evans, Is the Quantified Employee a Healthier Employee?, FAST CO. (Sept.
2014),
http://www.fastcompany.com/3036364/wearables-week/is-the-quantified-employee-ahealthier-employee (“According to ABI Research, more than 13 million wearable fitness tracking
devices are expected to be incorporated into employee wellness programs within the next five
years.”); see also Martin, supra note 7 (“By 2018, more than 13 million wearable activitytracking devices will be integrated into employee wellness programs, based on estimates from
ABI research.”).
84. Stuart Dredge, Why the Workplace of 2016 Could Echo Orwell’s 1984, THE GUARDIAN
(Aug. 22, 2015), http://www.theguardian.com/technology/2015/aug/23/data-and-trackingdevices-in-the-workplace-amazon.
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who, with their employees’ permission, “can then track their workers’
health, see how active individual employees are, and foster a little healthy
competition.”85 Both employers and employees seem to benefit from this
exchange,86 but the trend also seems to be incentive-based: employees
agree to wear fitness trackers and, in exchange, receive benefits from their
employers.87 For instance, Shannon Daly, Vice President of Human
Resources at the cloud-consultancy firm Apriro, suggests that companies
“[o]ffer the fitness trackers as an incentive and give them away where
possible . . . . Provide challenges that motivate employees to participate in
your company wellness program using the tracker. Be transparent and
explain how the employee metadata results may be used.”88
Another example of this incentive-based approach is Bates College,
which recently offered Fitbit “Zip” devices to employees in order to
encourage participation in its employee wellness competition (called
“Ready, Set, Go”).89 Thirty-five percent of the college’s 700 employees
currently participate in the program.90 According to the program’s director,
Mike Milliken, “[w]hen we issued them initially, we were upfront about the
fact it wasn’t simply a gift for signing up. . . . They needed to earn it by
using it, and that seems to be driving engagement.”91 Even though
employees voluntarily participate in these programs, using fitness trackers
in employee wellness programs still raises significant privacy concerns as
to whether employers are using the information gathered by such devices
appropriately.92 In fact, journalist Jack Smith has anticipated the dangers
that will likely arise when employers receive their employees’ private
health information: “. . . once premiums and plans are directly tied to
employees’ day to day health, it’s pretty easy to imagine a world where
company culture, or even hiring decisions, are driven by individual

85. Jack Smith IV, Fitbit Is Now Officially Profiting From Users’ Health Data, OBSERVER
(Apr. 18, 2014), http://observer.com/2014/04/fitbit-is-now-officially-profiting-from-users-healthdata/#ixzz2zdt0LO2w; see also Martin, supra note 11 (“Fitness trackers, mobile apps and Webbased dashboards let workers count calories and steps, monitor sleep patterns, compete against
colleagues and earn prizes.”).
86. See Evans, supra note 83.
87. Martin, supra note 11.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id. (quoting Mike Milliken) (emphasis added).
92. See John F. Wasik, Employers’ Health Care Push: Play by Our Rules, or Pay, THE
FISCAL TIMES (Mar. 6, 2014), http://www.thefiscaltimes.com/Columns/2014/03/06/Empl
oyers-Make-Health-Care-Push-Play-Our-Rules-or-Pay#sthash.IAjxaAi8.dpuf (“[E]mployers are
increasingly calling the shots on how employees receive their benefits—and workers may be
penalized or rewarded depending upon how they take care of themselves. That means they may
be subject to regular monitoring and told to enroll in health care management programs.”).
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fitness.”93 For example, suppose two employees are up for the same
promotion, and Employee A volunteers to wear a fitness tracker provided
by the employer, but Employee B does not. Could the employer assume
Employee B is less of a team player than Employee A and hold that
assumption against him?
This example demonstrates another danger: whether an employee’s
choice to participate in a fitness-tracker-based wellness program will
remain truly voluntary. In his article, “Unraveling Privacy: The Personal
Prospectus and the Threat of a Full-Disclosure Future,” Scott Peppet argues
that companies are able to extract private information that they ordinarily
could not obtain by offering economic incentives to consumers who share
that information.94 The real danger, however, occurs when such incentivebased exchanges of sensitive, personal information become the norm:
“[a]lthough at first consumers may receive a discount for using a driving or
health monitor, privacy may unravel as those who refuse to disclose are
assumed to be withholding negative information and therefore stigmatized
and penalized.”95 It is easy to imagine how this concern could translate
into a workplace environment. Once a critical mass of employees begins
voluntarily exchanging private health information for incentives through
fitness trackers, it is probable that employers will assume that those who
refuse to do so have something to hide. While it is easy to imagine the
negative consequences that might result from such assumptions—denial of
opportunities, promotions, etc.—those who are affected are unlikely to
receive redress for these injuries because instances of negative
discrimination are difficult to prove. Because of the danger that PFI will be
used for discriminatory purposes, fitness tracker regulation is necessary to
prevent the use of PFI for discriminatory or other improper purposes.
C.

Big Data Is Always Watching: The Dangers of Big Data and Fitness
Trackers

Fitness trackers have the potential to cause especially egregious
invasions of privacy when the health information gathered by such devices
ends up in the hands of Big Data. Big Data can be defined as a “problemsolving philosophy that leverages massive datasets and algorithmic analysis
to extract ‘hidden information and surprising correlations.’”96 Unlike the
surveillance at issue in Katz, which was collected for a specific purpose and
93. Smith, supra note 85.
94. Scott R. Peppet, Unraveling Privacy: The Personal Prospectus and the Threat of a FullDisclosure Future, 105 NW. U.L. REV. 1153, 1155 (2011).
95. Id. at 1156.
96. Woodrow Hartzog & Evan Selinger, Big Data in Small Hands, 66 STAN. L. REV.
ONLINE 81 (Sept. 2013).
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likely kept for a limited period of time,97 the data collected by fitness
trackers can be retained indefinitely on a company’s servers. This section
will demonstrate that the combination of fitness trackers and Big Data is
particularly threatening to privacy rights for three primary reasons: (1)
there is a lack of awareness about the use of information by Big Data that
prevents users from making informed decisions about sharing their private
information; (2) even if consumers do understand the impact of Big Data,
data gathered today will likely have unexpected future uses; and (3) the line
between de-identified and identifying data is becoming increasingly blurry
because it is becoming easier to identify users through information that
both users and companies treat as anonymous. While each of these issues
presents privacy concerns on its own, together these three problems
seriously undermine the ability of current protections to adequately secure
individual privacy rights by breaking down privacy protections from three
different, but related, directions.
1.

Consumers’ Lack of Perception About the Predictive Power of Big Data
Compromises Their Ability to Make Informed Decisions About Their Fitness
Information

One of the most basic dangers presented by fitness trackers is the lack
of consumer awareness about how PFI can be used when it is collected in
the aggregate. Turner provides the example of the two-way mirror to
illustrate this problem: “the end-user sees her own activities reflected in the
two-way mirror, and does not realize that on the other side, she is actually
being observed by any number of faceless, non-descript organizations that
she probably does not even know exist.”98 Because consumers are not fully
cognizant of how their information will be used once it is collected by
fitness trackers, it is difficult for users to make informed choices about
how, when, or even if they should record and share the nuances of their
daily lives. In fact, many of the privacy protections currently relied upon,
such as Privacy Policies, Terms of Service, and “Opt-In” policies, require
consumers to be informed in order to be effective. Put simply, consent is
less probative when users do not fully understand what they are consenting
to. Without effective understanding of how data will be used when
collected in the aggregate, users are susceptible to “sleepwalking into a
surveillance society.”99
In a recent paper, researchers from Clemson University conducted
qualitative content analysis of online comments related to users’ privacy
97. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
98. See Turner, supra note 7, at 383.
99. Jules Polonetsky & Omer Tene, Privacy and Big Data: Making Ends Meet, 66 STAN. L.
REV. 25 (2013).
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concerns about wearable devices.100 They found that users perceived
devices worn on the wrist, including fitness trackers, as presenting fewer
privacy concerns than other devices.101 The researchers suggest that users
likely do not understand how this data can be misused by third parties, the
privacy implications that arise when data is retained for long periods of
time, or how this data can be combined with complementary data.102 For
instance, despite finding that users do not perceive devices like fitness
trackers as threatening, the authors’ analysis suggests that GPS sensors
present the most critical privacy concerns for users of wearable devices.103
Thus, this research suggests that users have a false sense of security when it
comes to fitness trackers—they mistakenly view these devices as having
fewer privacy concerns even though activity trackers involve critical
privacy concerns like tracking and recording user locations.
This lack of awareness seems to stem from users’ perception of fitness
trackers as harmless, innocuous devices. Australian privacy advocate and
researcher Katina Michael has addressed consumers’ misconceptions about
fitness trackers by going so as far as to compare fitness trackers to “state
surveillance anklets.”104 She declared, “[w]e’re being duped into thinking
they’re liberating devices, when they’re devices of enslavement. . . . And
consumers aren’t saying ‘uh-oh, there’s a problem here’. They’re saying
‘bring it on!’”105 While Michael’s comments may seem harsh, her point is
critical: consumers often underestimate and place too much trust in their
fitness trackers.
One explanation for users’ false sense of security regarding fitness
trackers is the fact that these devices are often worn like fashion
accessories or jewelry106 and, consequently, blend seamlessly into users’
daily lives. For example, Leaf, a new fitness tracker set to hit the market in
May 2015, is designed to be worn as a necklace and is even marketed as

100. Vivian Genaro Motti & Kelly Caine, Users’ Privacy Concerns About Wearables:
Impact of Form Factor, Sensors and Type of Data Collected 1 CLEMSON UNIV.,
http://fc15.ifca.ai/preproceedings/wearable/paper_2.pdf.
101. Id. at 4.
102. Id. at 5.
103. Id. at 4.1.
104. Richard Chirgwin, Welcome to ‘Uber-veillance’ Says Australian Privacy Foundation,
THE REGISTER (Jan. 13, 2015), http://www.theregister.co.uk/2015/01/13/its_already_too_late_
for_privacy/.
105. Id.
106. See Molly Wood, Jawbone Up3 Band Takes Tracking to the Extreme, N.Y. TIMES (Nov.
6, 2014), http://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2014/11/06/jawbone-up3-band-takes-tracking-to-the-extr
eme/?ref=technology&_r=0. (describing how Jawbone’s fitness tracking devices increasingly
look like jewelry and reporting that Jawbone encourages its partners to design versions that look
even more like bracelets than activity monitors).
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“the world’s smartest piece of jewelry.”107 Apple and Fitbit both offer
interchangeable bands designed by luxury brands such as Hermès and Tory
Burch,108 and the newly released Apple Watch is advertised as not only a
powerful, multifaceted smart device, but also a “true expression of your
personal taste.”109 Because fitness trackers are deigned to blend into users’
lifestyles, users are unlikely to seriously consider the privacy implications
raised by such devices and are more likely to view them as innocuous
everyday objects. This misperception of fitness trackers poses serious
threats to protecting user privacy. While users may understand the privacy
risks associated with wearing fitness trackers, they are less likely to view
these concerns seriously if they think of their fitness tracker as a stylish,
harmless accessory. The tendency to underestimate these privacy concerns
will, therefore, undermine privacy protections such as requiring Privacy
Policies, agreeing to Terms of Service, and “Opt-In” approaches by
diminishing the level of care users exercise when deciding whether to opt
in or agree to a company’s policies.110
2.

Because Data Gathered Today Will Likely Be Used for Unforeseen Purposes,
It Is Unlikely that Current Privacy Protections Will Be Able to Adequately
Guard Against Future Uses of Data

Even assuming that users do fully appreciate the privacy concerns
surrounding the current uses of data gathered by fitness trackers, sensitive
information gathered and shared by connected devices is often used for
unforeseen purposes. While users may make informed decisions about
casually sharing personal information in one context, it is becoming much
easier for seemingly innocuous data to be used to elicit unexpectedly
revealing information.111 For example, a recent study suggests that a
computer model can predict individual personality traits such as how much
someone drinks, whether they do drugs, and what subject they are likely to

107. See BELLABEAT, https://www.bellabeat.com (last visited May 5, 2015) (describing the
Leaf fitness tracker with the tagline “technology meets fashion”).
108. See Hermès, APPLE, http://www.apple.com/apple-watch-hermes/ (last visited Sept. 15,
2015); see also Tory Burch for Fitbit, FITBIT, https://www.fitbit.com/toryburch (last visited Sept.
15, 2015).
109. Apple Watch, APPLE, http://www.apple.com/watch/?cid=wwa-us-kwg-watch-com (last
visited May 5, 2015).
110. See e.g., Emma Hutchings, Fitbit Users’ Sexual Activity Found In Google Search
Results, PSFK (July 4, 2011), http://www.psfk.com/2011/07/fitbit-users-sexual-activity-found-ingoogle-search-results.html (reporting that users who were not careful with their privacy settings
inadvertently allowed their sexual activity data, collected and shared by FitBit, to appear in
Google search results).
111. See Anna North, How Your Facebook Likes Could Cost You a Job, N.Y. TIMES (Jan.
20, 2015), http://op-talk.blogs.nytimes.com/2015/01/20/how-your-facebook-likes-could-cost-youa-job/?_r=1.
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study, based solely on that person’s Facebook likes.112 Other researchers
assert that Facebook likes can reveal attributes, including gender, sexual
orientation, race, intelligence, and political leanings.113 While Facebook
likes, like fitness trackers, are seemingly harmless, these studies
demonstrate that the door is open for automated psychological assessment
and other inferences based on an individual’s digital footprint and
performed without permission or notice.114 Similarly, in a recent FTC Staff
Report, one researcher hypothesized that “although a consumer may today
use a fitness tracker solely for wellness-related purposes, the data gathered
by the device could be used in the future to price health or life insurance or
to infer the user’s suitability for credit or employment.”115 For instance,
researchers at the University of Illinois have developed an app for smart
watches that can track the keystrokes made by someone wearing the
device.116 While the app is still in its early stages and has not yet been
perfected, the researchers anticipate that this technology could result in
“motion leaks” and could potentially reveal personal information like
passwords and login credentials.117 As one user attempts to use Fitbit as
evidence in a Canadian personal injury case,118 this raises further questions
about how the health information gathered by fitness trackers could have

112. Id.
113. See Adi Kamdar & Dave Maass, You Won’t Like What Your Facebook ‘Likes’ Reveal,
ELEC. FRONTIER FOUND. (Mar. 13, 2013), https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2013/03/facebook-likesreveal-sensitive-personal-information (reporting that researchers, based on Facebook likes, were
able to predict whether a user was African American or white 95% of the time, male or female
93% of the time, sexual orientation 88% of the time for men and 75% of the time for women,
political leaning (Republican versus Democrat) 85% of the time, and whether your parents
divorced when you were a kid 60% of the time, make reasonably accurate guesses about whether
you were a drug user, drinker, or smoker, as well as a host of other attributes, including emotional
stability, satisfaction with life, and extraversion).
114. See id. (stating that information individuals share for one purpose can now easily be
collated and acted upon “for wildly different purposes”); see also North, supra note 111.
115. FTC, INTERNET OF THINGS: PRIVACY & SECURITY IN A CONNECTED WORLD, FTC
STAFF REPORT (Jan. 2015), https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/reports/federal-tradecommission-staff-report-november-2013-workshop-entitled-internet-things-privacy/150127iotrpt.
pdf.
116. Victoria Woollaston, Smartwatch Hack Lets Criminals Know What You’re TYPING:
Motion Sensors Can Remotely Reveal Which Keys You’re Pressing, DAILY MAIL (Sept. 11,
2015), http://www.dailymail.co.uk/sciencetech/article-3230815/Smartwatch-hack-lets-criminalsknow-TYPING-Motion-sensors-remotely-reveal-keys-pressing.html.
117. Id.
118. See Kate Crawford, When Fitbit Data Is the Expert Witness, THE ATLANTIC (Nov.
19, 2014), http://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2014/11/when-fitbit-is-the-expertwitness/382936/.
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unanticipated significance in future legal cases, employment decisions,
disability claims, or insurance benefits.119
The concerns surrounding unanticipated uses of PFI are both distinct
from and related to the underestimation of the privacy risks associated with
these devices. While both issues deal with users’ difficulty or resistance to
grasping the privacy risks that currently exist, the unforeseen future uses of
private information raise particularly high privacy concerns because this
problem might not be solved by simply providing notice or educating
consumers about the risks of sharing data. Even someone who makes
careful and considered decisions about sharing information cannot be
certain that their data will not be used for some unanticipated and
detrimental purpose in the future.
3.

As It Becomes Easier to Re-identify Users Through “Anonymized” Data, the
Line Between Identifying and Non-identifying Data Is Beginning to Disappear

The ability of users to effectively control how their own fitness data is
used and shared is further complicated by the blurring line between
identifying and non-identifying data.120 Most companies that offer fitness
tracking devices draw a distinction between sharing non-identifying and
identifying data with third parties.121 Fitbit’s privacy policy, for example,
permits the company to share and sell aggregated, de-identified data for
research or reports about health and fitness.122 For example, shortly after

119. See id. (“The current lawsuit is an example of Fitbit data being used to support a
plaintiff in an injury case, but wearables data could just as easily be used by insurers to deny
disability claims, or by prosecutors seeking a rich source of self-incriminating evidence.”).
120. See Giulio Coraggio, What is Anonymous Data?, GAMING TECH L.BLOG (May 12,
2014),
http://www.gamingtechlaw.com/2014/05/what-is-anonymous-data.html
(“Problems
relating to what data/images/information can be consider [sic] anonymous is one of the major
data protection issues of privacy law having an impact in any sector including the Internet of
Things, eHealth and on any activity that tries to rely on Big Data or in general large databases.”).
121. See e.g., Fitbit Privacy Policy, FITBIT, http://www.fitbit.com/privacy (last visited Feb.
10, 2015) (“First and foremost: We don’t sell any data that could identify you. We only share data
about you when it is necessary to provide the Fitbit Service, when the data is de-identified
and aggregated, or when you direct us to share it.”); Website Privacy, JAWBONE,
https://jawbone.com/privacy (last visited Feb. 10, 2015) (“We do not rent, sell or otherwise share
your individual, personal information with third parties . . . We share aggregated usage statistics
that cannot be used to identify you individually.”); Basis Privacy Policy, BASIS,
https://www.mybasis.com/legal/privacy/ (last visited Feb 10, 2015) (“We may share or sell
aggregated, de-identified data with third parties, including, but not limited to, for marketing
purposes or with research organizations”); Privacy Policy, WITHINGS, http://www-medi
a-cdn.withings.com/wysiwyg/legal/2015-Privacy-policy-VUS.pdf?_ga=1.84430169.1929328589.
1423651096 (last visited Feb. 10, 2015) (“We undertake not to sell your personal data without
your prior agreement. At Withings, we firmly believe that data can serve the collective interest.
We may produce statistics and analyses using collected data. They would first be anonymized and
aggregated beforehand to assure your privacy to be protected.”).
122. FitBit Privacy Policy, supra note 121.
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the 2015 Super Bowl, Fitbit used fitness information gathered by its
devices to measure and track its users’ excitement throughout the game by
examining users’ heart rates.123 Fitbit’s Privacy Policy explains, “[w]hen
we provide this information, we perform appropriate procedures so that the
data does not identify you and we contractually prohibit recipients of the
data from re-identifying it back to you.”124 Thus, the line between
identifying and non-identifying data is critical because many companies
and privacy regulations125 use that line as the boundary for determining
which data may be shared with, or even sold to, third parties. As that line
blurs (because it is becoming easier to reidentify anonymized data126),
many of the privacy safeguards currently in place will become ineffective
and relatively meaningless, leaving consumers vulnerable to potentially
vast invasions of privacy, ranging from unforeseen uses of data to the reidentification of supposedly anonymous data.
Recently, researchers have been calling attention to the ease with
which de-identified information can be reidentified, exposing users’
identities, by cross-referencing that data with other data sets.127 As early as
2000, researcher Latanya Sweeney showed that eighty-seven percent of
Americans could be identified using only their birth date, zip code, and
sex.128 After Netflix released an anonymized data set of 100 million movie
ratings collected from nearly half a million users as part of a contest in
2006, researchers Arvind Narayanan and Vitalu Shmatikov were able to
“unmask” these anonymous users by cross-referencing the anonymized
data, which included timestamps, with non-anonymized movie ratings

123. Robert DS, Heart-Racing Moments from the Big Game, THE FITBIT BLOG (Feb. 3,
2015), http://blog.fitbit.com/heart-racing-moments-from-the-big-game/#i.ml8qpjotef9hur.
124. Id.
125. See Paul Ohm, Broken Promises of Privacy: Responding to the Surprising Failure of
Anonymization, 57 UCLA L. REV. 1701, 1704 (2010) (“[N]early every information privacy law
or regulation grants a get-out-of-jail-free cardto those who anonymize their data.”).
126. See e.g., Nate Anderson, “Anonymized” Data Really Isn’t—and Here’s Why Not, ARS
TECHNICA (Sept. 8, 2009), http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2009/09/your-secrets-live-onlinein-databases-of-ruin/; Kim Zetter, The World’s Most Wired Computer Scientist: Arvind
Narayanan, WIRED (June 18, 2012), http://www.wired.com/2012/06/wmw-arvind-narayanan/;
Nate Anderson, Pulling Back the Curtain on “Anonymous” Twitterers, ARS TECHNICA (Mar. 31,
2009), http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2009/03/pulling-back-the-curtain-on-anonymous-twitter
ers/.
127. See Ohm, supra note 125, at 716 (arguing that researchers have essentially “blown up”
the robust anonymization assumption, casting doubt on the ability of de-identification to
adequately protect users’ identities); Anderson, “Anonymized” Data Really Isn’t—and Here’s
Why Not, supra note 126; Anderson, Pulling Back the Curtain on “Anonymous” Twitterers,
supra note 126; Eric Bangeman, AOL Subscribers Sue Over Data Leak, ARS TECHNICA (Sept. 26,
2006), http://arstechnica.com/business/2006/09/7835/; Zetter, supra note 126.
128. Anderson, “Anonymized” Data Really Isn’t—and Here’s Why Not, supra note 126.
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posted publicly on the Internet Movie Database.129 In 2009, Narayanan and
Shmatikov used similar methods on Twitter and Flickr to demonstrate once
again that data can easily be cross-referenced with other data sets in order
to expose users’ identities.130 In that case, they found that one-third of
users who have accounts on both Twitter and Flickr could be identified on
Twitter using their Flickr connections.131 Like Netflix, AOL also
inadvertently exposed users to privacy intrusions when they released search
queries performed by 65,000 of its users.132 Even though AOL had
anonymized the data by “scrubbing” it of personal information, computer
scientists were still able to use that data to identify individual users.133
These examples of easy re-identification expose the serious flaws of
permitting companies to share anonymized data. They demonstrate that,
with the right reference points, the distinction between identifying and
anonymized data can be circumvented in order to reveal and exploit
personal information. Even though Fitbit states in its Privacy Policy that it
contractually prevents its partners from reidentifying user data,134 it is
unclear how effectively Fitbit is able to enforce that policy, and many other
companies do not even include such protections in their policies. The line
between anonymized and identifying information is particularly crucial in
the context of fitness trackers that track information like user locations,
activity levels, sleep habits, or heart rates. If personal information can be
accessed through anonymized search queries, Facebook likes, Twitter IDs,
and Netflix information, it is easy to imagine cross-referencing the
anonymized data shared by companies like Jawbone or Basis with other
data points in order to reidentify individual users. If computer scientists
can predict political leanings, sexual orientation, or emotional stability
based on an individual user’s Facebook likes,135 it is highly probable that
similar inferences can be made from data gathered by fitness trackers,
which measure users’ lives in granular detail.
The concerns surrounding reidentified data are further amplified when
taken together with users’ false sense of security concerning fitness
trackers and future unanticipated uses of shared information. Following the
current trajectory of current data uses, it is not difficult to imagine a

129. Zetter, supra note 126.
130. Anderson, Pulling Back the Curtain on “Anonymous” Twitterers, supra note 126.
131. Id.
132. Bangeman, supra note 127.
133. Anderson, “Anonymized” Data Really Isn’t—and Here’s Why Not, supra note 126; see
also Bangeman, supra note 127 (reporting that the New York Times was even able to use this data
to track down searcher no. 4417749, a 62-year-old widow in Georgia).
134. See Fitbit Privacy Policy, supra note 121.
135. Kamdar & Maass, supra note 113.
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scenario in which “anonymized’ data collected and shared by fitness
trackers today is reidentified using non-anonymized reference points in the
future to create a digital footprint used in employment decisions, insurance
benefits, legal proceedings, and other decisions that significantly impact
users’ lives.

IV. Proposal: Statutory Guidelines for Fitness
Trackers Modeled After HIPAA
Fitness trackers present heightened and unique privacy concerns
because they collect and transmit the intimate and granular details of users’
lives. In the hands of computer scientists, employers, insurance companies,
or other entities, this information has the potential to reveal shocking
amounts of information about users’ health, personality, and behavior.
While most laws and privacy policies limit a company’s ability to share or
sell identifying personal information, researchers have explicitly shown
that anonymized data can be cross-referenced with publically available
non-anonymized data to identify individual “anonymous” users.136 These
developments have opened the floodgates for unanticipated and insidious
uses of data collected by fitness trackers to target and make intimate
inferences about individual users.
Even though the information gathered by fitness trackers is not
currently protected by HIPAA (unless that information happens to qualify
as PHI under HIPAA137), it constitutes sensitive information and should be
protected as such. Additionally, because users often perceive fitness
trackers as harmless accessories, rather than devices that transmit and store
huge amounts of revealing health information, regulation is necessary to
ensure consumers make effective and informed decisions concerning such
devices. In order to adequately protect users’ privacy rights against the
daunting potential uses of fitness tracker information, Congress should
adopt a statutory scheme modeled after HIPPAA (or alternatively, an
extension of HIPAA specifically crafted for fitness trackers and healthrelated mobile applications) with six critical components: (1) Flexibility,
(2) Data Minimization, (3) Notice and Control, (4) Limitations on Future
Uses, (5) Security, and (6) Data Breach Notification. While none of these
components can effectively guard against privacy invasions alone, together
they create a comprehensive approach that limits the way health
information is gathered and stored by fitness trackers, enables users to

136. See Ohm, supra note 125, at 716.
137. Summary of the HIPAA Privacy Rule, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS.,
supra note 6.
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make informed choices about how and when they share fitness information,
and protects that information once it has been shared.
A.

Flexibility: The Key to Staying Ahead of the Technological Curve

While flexibility is not an explicit feature of this proposed statutory
scheme, it is a necessary component of any statutory approach to regulating
fitness trackers. The number138 and variety139 of fitness trackers is rising,
and computer scientists are improving in their ability to reidentify
supposedly anonymized data.140 In order to keep up with the rapidly
changing field of fitness trackers, any approach must be flexible enough to
adapt to technological and marketplace advances. This can be achieved by
establishing broad guidelines similar to those established by HIPAA. Even
though HHS is responsible for civil enforcement of HIPAA, 141 as Solove
and Winn both recognize, state courts have also used the standards set forth
by HIPAA to establish the standard of care in tort cases.142 A similar
approach should apply to fitness trackers. While federal agencies should
have the power to enforce fitness tracker regulations, the proposed statute
would also explicitly allow state courts to use such regulations to establish
the standard of care in common law tort cases. Such an approach would
allow the standard set forth by the proposed regulation to evolve in
response to technological changes.
B.

Data Minimization: Who Can Store What and For How Long?

In order to properly protect fitness tracker information, the proposed
statute must limit the collection and retention of PFI. Because data
collected in aggregate can be used for unforeseen future purposes,143
Congress should limit the amount of health information gathered and
retained by companies that offer fitness trackers to the public. The HIPAA
Privacy Rule provides substantial guidance on this subject by requiring
covered entities to make reasonable efforts to use and disclose only the
minimum amount of PHI needed for an intended purpose.144 Fitness tracker
regulation should also require companies to collect only the health
138. See Martin, supra note 11.
139. See Rose, supra note 1; Fitbit, Find Your Fit, supra note 17; Jawbone, Compare
Trackers, supra note 19.
140. See Ohm, supra note 125, at 716; Anderson, “Anonymized” Data Really Isn’t—and
Here’s Why Not, supra note 126.
141. U.S. Dep’t of Health and Human Servs., Summary of the HIPAA Privacy Rule, supra
note 6; Solove, supra note 39, at 106.
142. See Solove, supra note 69; Winn, supra note 69.
143. See, e.g., North, supra note 111; Kamdar & Maass, supra note 113.
144. Summary of the HIPAA Privacy Rule, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS.,
supra note 6.
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information required for a particular task or use. The proposed regulation
would take this approach a step further by also limiting the retention of data
that is no longer necessary for the intended purpose. This would mean that
companies would be barred from storing or selling information that is no
longer needed “just in case” it may come in handy later for a future
unforeseen use. Even though this standard may be difficult to define and
apply, establishing such a standard would at the very least put companies
on notice that their ability to collect data is not unlimited. While not a
complete solution, these limitations would significantly diminish the
danger that information gathered today will be used to make important
decisions about consumers in the future.
C.

Notice & Control: Giving Consumers the Tools They Need in Order to
Make Informed Decisions About Sensitive Information.

HIPAA also facilitates users’ control over PHI through its Notice,
Authorization, and Right of Access requirements.145
The Notice
requirement establishes that covered entities must make their privacy
practices known to patients, while the Right of Access and Authorization
requirements increase the degree of control patients exercise over their
PHI.146 The proposed statute would include similar provisions to ensure
that consumers are adequately informed as to how their data is being used
and to safeguard users’ ability to exercise effective control over their health
information. To achieve this purpose, the statute would explicitly require
companies to outline all current uses of data, as well as any anticipated
future uses. If companies reserve the right to share or sell de-identified
data to third parties, they would also be required to disclose the risks of reidentification to consumers. Companies would also be required to disclose
further steps consumers can take to protect their PFI, such as encryption.
Moreover, any data uses that are not necessary to the primary use of the
device would require users to explicitly “opt-in” to those uses. Finally, the
proposed statute would also explicitly prohibit certain uses of PFI, such as
using PFI for discriminatory purposes. While such actions may be difficult
to prove and may overlap with other areas of law, such as employment law,
these regulations would at least send a clear message to companies that
certain uses are improper and would help to establish a company’s duty to
its users. These measures would increase the degree of control users
exercise over their PFI and improve consumers’ ability to make considered
and informed decisions regarding their fitness information.

145. Id.
146. Id.
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Security: Protecting Sensitive Information Once It Has Been Shared

Without effective security requirements, any statutory scheme would
be unable to adequately protect against privacy invasions that may occur
once PFI is shared. Accordingly, the proposed regulation would also
include security requirements modeled after the HIPAA Security Rule.
The legislation would impose security requirements on all information
gathered by fitness trackers and stored by the companies who sell such
devices. Like the HIPAA Security Rule,147 the proposed statute would
require companies to (1) ensure the confidentiality of health information
collected and stored by fitness trackers (including through encryption); (2)
identify and protect against threats to security (both on their servers and in
the devices themselves); (3) take reasonable precautions against
impermissible uses and disclosures; (4) provide adequate training to its
employees and business associates; and (5) ensure compliance by its
employees and business associates. These measures would aid in the
protection of health information by significantly decreasing the risk of
improper disclosures and data breaches.
E.

Data Breach Notification: Applying the HITECH Act to Fitness
Trackers

The proposed statute would also include data breach and notification
requirements modeled after the HITECH Act.148 Like the HITECH Act,
the proposed statute would require companies to notify customers of
breaches within 60 days of discovering the breach and notify the media for
breaches affecting more than 500 customers. It would also require
companies to perform an investigation into how the breach occurred and
remedy any gaps in their security or policies as soon as reasonably
possible. Assuming a breach does occur, these measures would aid in the
protection of PFI by regulating how companies deal with breaches, and by
diminishing the risk of future invasions of privacy.

V. Conclusion
Even though the reasonable expectation of privacy has changed
significantly since Katz, that standard is still alive today in the form of
privacy policies and statutes like HIPAA and the FTCA, which protect
against the improper disclosure of users’ personal information. These
measures safeguard consumer privacy by limiting the circumstances in
which users’ information may be shared with or sold to third parties. The
147. See U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS., HITECH Act Enforcement Interim
Final Rule, supra note 54.
148. Id.
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regulation of fitness trackers is an urgent issue that should be addressed by
Congress because fitness trackers are becoming extremely popular and are
beginning to be used in new contexts such as employment and insurance
coverage.
The fitness tracker statute proposed in this note would fill a statutory
gap by providing specific regulation of the PFI collected by fitness
trackers. The proposed statute would follow the guidelines for protecting
PHI established by HIPAA and adapt them for the purposes of protecting
PFI gathered by fitness trackers. Like HIPAA, the statute would be
designed to strike a balance between protecting users’ fitness information
and allowing companies to continue to provide their beneficial fitness
tracking services to the public. While the proposed statute will admittedly
place some burden on the companies that manufacture and sell fitness
trackers, that burden is necessary in order to adequately protect consumers.
PFI must be regulated because it has the potential to reveal intimate
personal information about users, which, when collected in the aggregate,
can be used to make discriminatory or otherwise unfair decisions about
consumers without their knowledge.
Moreover, regulation is also
necessary because users tend to underestimate the privacy concerns
associated with fitness trackers. The proposed statute would protect
consumers by increasing transparency between customers and companies,
provide clear guidelines for companies, increase the security of PFI, and
limit the improper use of fitness information.

